Expenses run high, but after nine months as a public company, earnings turn
positive ($0.08 a share), short-sellers panic, and the stock skyrockets.
The venture capitalists cash out some of their chips for a fortune, and a
few years later, so too do some of the original employees. Options granted
when the stock was at $10 a share (adjusted for splits) allows the lucky
employees to buy shares now worth $100. SECY has 20 million shares outstanding
but has handed out options covering half-again as many. The folks who had
been working for peanuts find their options are now worth $900 million as
they pay $10 to exercise each option and immediately sell the shares on the
open market for $100, or a $90 per share profit.
This is a happy scenario that fulfills everyone's dreams. But back to options
accounting, here's how things work. As SECY's star technicians cash out their
options, generating $900 million in capital gains, SECY gets to expense this
amount as compensation. Figure a 40% tax rate, and SECY will save itself
$360 million in taxes, most of which still makes it to the U.S. Treasury
by way of individual capital gains taxes on the executives cashing out. Yet
the funny thing about this compensation expense is that it never affects
earnings the way other normal labor costs do. Had these sizeable option grants
been expensed over the course of the vesting period, there's no way SECY
reports its first profitable quarter during that first year as a public company.
In fact, with profits now a long way off, the stock might flounder, a successful
secondary offering might have never happened. In that case, the stock may
not have risen to $100 and those options may not be worth anywhere close
to $900 million.
That, at least, is the vision of how things might have been had the FASB
not backed off its original 1992 proposal (which had been under development
since 1984) to change the way firms account for options. Venture capitalists,
securities firms, members of Congress, and top executives from Silicon Valley,
where options are like the sacraments, all raised a fuss. In effect, they
charged that anything that curtailed the granting of stock options, and so
substantially changed the rules for creating earnings, would choke off the
very lifeblood of the U.S. economy: the high-tech start-up company.
Still, what the FASB was trying to do made a certain sense. If you're using
options to compensate your top talent and you eventually get hefty tax benefits
when those options are exercised, then why not call a spade a spade and expense
the things, charging them against earnings now. The tax benefit doesn't
disappear, it just trickles down all along the way instead of five or ten
years down the road when the options are actually exercised. Investors who
may not be hip to the sleight-of-hand that disguises these labor costs might
benefit considerably from making it plain. After all, how exactly can old
SECY earn, say, $50 million a year when about $140 million in compensation
is just ignored? It's tempting to say that nothing much would really change
-- except the reported earnings of those companies most committed to stock
options. And that's only a scary prospect if we assume that earnings and
the valuation models they support are set in stone like holy writ. If earnings
are culturally created (by accountants, no less), why not fiddle with the
creation if you can find a way to make them more useful, more forthright?
Ah, the naivete of accountants!
Part 3: A Compromise Found
(c) Copyright 1997, The Motley Fool. All rights reserved. This
material is for personal use only. Republication and redissemination, including
posting to news groups, is expressly prohibited without the prior written
consent of The Motley Fool. |