Over 400,000 people die every year as a result
of smoking-related illness and tobacco companies actively market their products
to minors in order to balance a domestic demand equation that has remained
relatively flat for years. At the same time, we are no longer living in the
40's and 50's, and it is now widely known that smoking kills -- autonomous
individuals in a free society are allowed to make their own choices with
regard to engaging in legal activities. As to the perennially debated question
of addiction; fast food cheeseburgers are addictive, cheap and cause heart
disease but no one's suing McDonalds... yet.
Different actors have different obligations.
As a public policy maker, the common interest is protected by banning smoking
in the public space, so that the potential harm engendered by the activity
is limited to those that choose to engage in it. Similarly, the obligation
of this columnist, fortunately, is not to moralize about the evils of smoking,
gambling or drinking but to report the facts surrounding the amazing amounts
of cash that these activities generate.
This forum is extroverted in its agnosticism,
because this columnist's opinions on "moral issues" are of no value to you.
They are just another person's opinion. You, dear Fool, are sufficiently
endowed to make these judgments yourself, therefore the focus of this column
concerns questions of valuation. So if the tobacco industry offends you,
invest in a socially responsible mutual
fund and find out more about what you can do to ban smoking. Just please,
please, don't write the Fool any letters about the evils of smoking. Back
to our regularly scheduled programming.
Clearing The Air
The litigation bombshell recently dropped by industry
troublemaker Bennet Lebow may turn out to be a dud. Lebow, the majority
shareholder of BROOKE GROUP LTD. <% if gsSubBrand = "aolsnapshot" then Response.Write("(NYSE: BGL)") else Response.Write("(NYSE: BGL)") end if %>, which in turn owns Liggett
Group, agreed to break ranks with its partners in crime and turn over thousands
of documents detailing industrywide closed-door discussions on nicotine to
states' attorneys. Attempts by industry giants to block release of these
documents based upon violation of joint attorney-client privilege have not
met with much success (full rulings will come after March 31).
The terms of Lebow's agreement negotiated with the
22 states filing suits against the industry makes Liggett a more attractive
acquisition target, as the lesser of two settlement evils (the four remaining
tobacco companies are fighting two major class action suits). The agreement
was actually tailored to stir passions in the upcoming proxy battle at RJR
NABISCO <% if gsSubBrand = "aolsnapshot" then Response.Write("(NYSE: RN)") else Response.Write("(NYSE: RN)") end if %>, where only the revenues of the tobacco arm would
be threatened, not Nabisco. The terms of the agreement were structured in
this manner to provide incentives for RJR shareholders to opt for a split-up
of the company (Lebow and financier Carl Icahn own 5.8% of RJR and hope to
break the company in two).
Ultimately, even if an industrywide settlement did
occur, the companies involved generate sufficient cash flow to easily cover
settlement fees in the range expected (12% of pre-tax profits over 25 years).
This may in turn serve as suitable closure for a segment weighed down by
litigation tribulations and restore depressed multiples to their full valuation
levels.
The average enterprise-to-EBITDA multiples of the
group are 5-7 times forward earnings (97'). Most other companies that sell
consumer staples trade at an average ratio of 10-15 times forward estimates.
Mulling over possible future scenarios, if Philip Morris were to be afforded
the same multiple as comparable consumer staples, the capital gains (tax)
that would have to be paid on that amount by shareholders would pay the entire
federal deficit for more than a year. Crazy.
Big Smoke
As a group, tobacco related concerns appreciated
20% in 1996, with some notable outperformers like Universal which was up
30% and Philip Morris up 25%. Tobacco companies thrive in a "no news" environment
and setting arbitrary time periods for evaluation is hampered by extreme
short-term sensitivity to litigation related news.
Tobacco will always be dominated by the large players,
primarily due to distribution related entry barriers to upstarts hoping to
undercut the big boys. Monthly cash payments to retailers, and marketing
agreements that cover shelf space allotments are de rigeur in the business,
insuring that the big names will always receive VIP treatment (Philip Morris's
"Marlboro" brand captured 47.8% of the American market last year). Tobacco
companies manage growth by careful balancing and marketing their portfolio
of brands in existing markets.
Tobacco is an international business, however, with
the U.S. accounting for a paltry 8% of the number of cigarettes smoked worldwide.
Out of the 5.5 billion packs of cigarettes consumed each year, only 480 million
are smoked by Americans. However, the demographics from country to country
are remarkably stable and not subject to huge swings in demand. In the U.S.,
roughly 26% of the population smokes, and this figure has remained stable
for a number of years. This has prompted a replenishment effect, where the
tobacco companies in order to insure stability in their revenue streams must
target young smokers. Overseas revenues for the major American cigarette
suppliers increased an average of 11% last year. The only way for tobacco
companies can grow their revenues is by expanding into new markets and
effectively marketing their brands.
For instance, Philip Morris and B.A.T. Industries
have much of their overseas plant capacity in Brazil where they enjoy significant
economies of scale in their operations. The more markets they can push their
products in, the lower their overall costs. Tobacco companies are constantly
involved in a complex balancing act that involves pricing, costs and product
mix. The companies have pricing flexibility overseas on the order of 3-4%
depending on the markets (somewhat less in the U.S.). It is this flexibility
that determines each company's tiered product offerings, from the low end
to premium brands, for each market. |